Latin America is trending toward more militarized security strategies, a trend that could be consolidated by elections across the region in the coming 18 months. As one consequence of civilian governments and publics embracing hard-line security approaches, the region’s militaries could become more powerful and politically influential.
Back in March, Saudi Arabia reportedly offered to join the Abraham Accords in exchange for the transfer of U.S. civil nuclear technology, among other things. Washington is reluctant to do so, as that technology could be used to develop nuclear weapons. But a nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia should not be particularly concerning for Washington.
The Wagner Group’s headline-making activity in Ukraine and recent attempted rebellion in Russia has brought renewed attention to the role of private military and security companies, or PMSCs, in contemporary conflicts. One under-explored facet of the rise of PMSCs is the effect of their proliferation on the delivery of humanitarian aid.
Nearly 1 million people have been displaced in eastern Congo since rebels from the March 23 Movement, or M23, reemerged in early 2022 after having been dormant for almost a decade. Since then, the insurgency has caused humanitarian needs in the area to skyrocket, while raising thorny questions about regional stability.
Upon taking office in January 2022, Honduran President Xiomara Castro promised to demilitarize public security. Instead, after a series of high-profile episodes of violence, she has mimicked the rhetoric and methods employed by Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, hoping to exploit its apparent efficacy, but especially its popular appeal.
The U.N. General Assembly just took a small step toward strengthening its role in international peace and security. The assembly typically plays second fiddle to the Security Council on such issues. But with the council embroiled in debates between Russia and the West, many U.N. members feel the assembly should compensate for its flaws.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s foreign policy moves almost always have a domestic angle, and his pivot back to the West since his reelection in May, as well as his return to orthodox economic policies, could all be aimed at one goal: winning favor with urban voters ahead of the 2024 municipal elections.
With NATO membership for Kyiv off the table in the immediate term, some are calling for an alternative mechanism dubbed the “Israel Model,” in which the U.S. would provide Ukraine with the kind of security it provides Israel so it can defend itself after the war ends. But there are several reasons why that approach is inappropriate.
The failed rebellion by Yevgeny Prigozhin in late June has created uncertainty about the Wagner Group’s future operations in Africa. U.S. and European policymakers should focus on making Wagner unviable should it try to regroup from the debacle back home, while building an approach to do the same when Russia tries again with other outfits.
Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s approach to the War on Drugs has proven far less radical than he promised—and less intelligible as well. But despite the obstacles to a total overhaul of Bogota’s strategy, a confluence of circumstances in both Colombia and the U.S. may offer a unique opportunity for drug policy reform.
With the collapse of efforts to contain jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel, neighboring states are faced with acute dilemmas when it comes to the mass displacement engulfing West Africa. The plight of Fulani refugees in Ghana facing deportation back to Burkina Faso offers insights into how these conflicts have escalated so disastrously.
Some observers are worried that the U.S. decision to supply cluster munitions to Ukraine will damage the international norm against their use. But while there are many other good reasons to be concerned, the reputational impact of this decision will likely fall on the parties themselves for violating the norm, not on the norm itself.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s annual leaders’ summit in early July highlighted the group’s potential to be a potent force multiplier for both Russia and China, particularly in the context of great power competition. But it is still a work in progress, and many obstacles remain before it can realize its potential.
This week, the leaders of CELAC, comprising the states of the Western Hemisphere excluding the U.S. and Canada, will meet with their EU counterparts in Brussels to discuss the two regions’ relationship. Early indications suggest that differences over Ukraine could potentially hinder progress on other important topics at the summit.
Israel’s military operations in the West Bank have strengthened popular resistance and energized Palestinian armed groups, and last week’s invasion of Jenin’s refugee camp marked another dangerous escalation. With increasing numbers of Palestinians supporting armed resistance, a new uprising against Israel seems increasingly likely.
This week’s NATO summit was an opportunity for the alliance to take a clearer position on its own role in the war in Ukraine, while also setting the direction for NATO’s future evolution. But rather than paving the way forward, the summit indicated that the alliance members are only ready for more of the same.
In April, Indonesian security forces engaged in a shootout with Islamist militants belonging to Jemaah Islamiyah, the group that carried out the 2002 Bali bombings. Though Indonesia has had success in combating homegrown terror groups, it still faces an uphill task in keeping Jemaah Islamiyah—and the ISIS-affiliated JAD—at bay.