Rebel forces in Syria made their most significant advance in years in a surprise offensive that began last Wednesday in the country’s northeastern region. By Saturday, anti-government forces had captured most of Aleppo, Syria’s largest city, and by yesterday were in control of a broad stretch of land in northeast Syria. The offensive unites a number of rebel factions, but is led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, which for more than a decade has controlled much of the Idlib province, the primary remaining rebel stronghold in Syria. (New York Times)
This offensive took nearly every observer by surprise, underscoring just how much the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011, had drifted off the world’s radar since reaching a point of stasis in the late 2010s. In the meantime, President Bashar al-Assad—who had become an international pariah for his conduct of the war, including the use of chemical weapons against civilians—began to rebuild ties with a number of the regional states that had once sought to topple his autocratic regime.
Now, though, this offensive is a reminder that absent a stable political resolution, frozen conflicts can heat back up quickly. And the resurgence of fighting puts back into the spotlight all of the contradictory tensions between the actors involved in the Syrian civil war, which has pit allies and partners outside the conflict against each other, and enemies outside the conflict on the same side in the fighting on the ground.
The U.S., for instance, has partnered with the Kurdish-led rebel militia Syrian Democratic Forces in the fight against the Islamic State, even as NATO ally Turkey actively opposes the group. Meanwhile, Turkey backs other rebel forces in Syria—including some currently fighting alongside HTS—despite Ankara’s closer ties in recent years with Moscow, whose intervention on behalf of Damascus in 2015 ultimately turned the war’s tide in Assad’s favor. Iran and Hezbollah also back the Assad regime, which has led Israel to often strike Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria, even though Israel would prefer to see Assad—a known commodity compared to the Syrian rebels—remain in power due to concerns over border security.
The recent weakening of Assad’s backers almost certainly played a part in the rebels’ calculus in launching their surprise offensive. Russia has committed the vast majority of its resources to the war in Ukraine, while Hezbollah has been severely weakened by its war with Israel. Indeed, while Russian forces already in Syria are reportedly aiding government forces, it’s telling that Iran-backed militias in Iraq are now being called in to help defend against any further rebel gains as well.
It remains to be seen if the rebel forces in Syria can make any further advances, or even maintain the territory they have claimed over the past week. Regardless, the surprise offensive speaks to a broader geopolitical debate that came up after Hamas’ attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023: whether the current geopolitical landscape—in particular the fraying of the global security order—is more enabling of conflict.
The observers who argue it is have pointed to the linkages between the various conflicts that have erupted in recent years, linkages that have only become clearer since Hamas’ attack. The war in Ukraine and the Middle East’s regional war now share a nearly overlapping set of conflict actors, with further linkages between the war in Sudan, geopolitical tensions in the Horn of Africa and regional rivalries in the Gulf that are exacerbated by global great power competition.
