Many observers have downplayed Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to Moscow last week to meet with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, saying it did little for Moscow. Others argued that it even sealed Russia’s fate as a vassal of China, whose domination of their partnership is now “complete.” But this might be short-sighted.
Last week, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin for the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia since the start of the invasion of Ukraine. The ICC’s decision to focus on the deportation of children, rather than other horrific crimes allegedly committed by Russian forces, is not as surprising as it might seem.
Russia occupies an unusual position on the world stage. Under President Vladimir Putin, Moscow has repeatedly demonstrated that it has the capacity to destabilize the international order, but not the capacity to fill the vacuum it is creating. This collection is an entry point to WPR’s comprehensive coverage of Putin’s Russia.
Last week the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin for organizing the scheme by which Ukrainian children have been taken from their families and deported to Russia. The move has been described as “unsurprising” and “encouraging.” But there is another word that can describe the ICC’s decision: unhelpful.
President Xi Jinping was in Moscow this week, where he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The visit comes just weeks after Beijing released a 12-point position paper on a political settlement to what it calls the “Ukraine Crisis.” But expectations that China is going to help broker a breakthrough in the near term are low.
The effects of the migration surge to the EU are being keenly felt at the union’s internal borders. For months now, “temporary” border checks have been imposed to stop people-smugglers from bringing migrants into the EU via the Balkan route. Now tensions are heating up ahead of a leaders summit next week to discuss the issue.
The Russia-Ukraine war has provided the U.S. military with valuable lessons, and the Ukrainian army’s successes validate much of the U.S. military’s doctrine and operational art. Yet there is also cause for concern: The U.S. might be well-prepared for the kind of war Russia has fought in Ukraine, but it is poorly provisioned for it.
Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas’ center-right coalition won a landslide victory in the country’s parliamentary election, with the Russia-Ukraine conflict a salient part of her campaign. The results were interesting not only because of Kallas’ sweeping win, but also for the drop in support for other established parties.
European officials are whispering nervously about this week’s reports that a pro-Ukraine group, and not Russia, may have been behind the bombing of the Nord Stream pipeline. Should that be proven, it would create an immensely awkward diplomatic headache for Europe, particularly the countries through which the pipeline passes.
The European Union’s integration has often been driven by crisis. At the same time, not every problem confronting European policymakers has led to further integration. It is only when specific external threats become intertwined with tensions inside the EU that a moment of crisis can present policymakers with an existential choice.
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has largely chosen caution over confrontation in Rome’s foreign policy. But when it comes to Italy’s position on the war in Ukraine, and by extension its bilateral relationship with Russia, her administration’s emphasis on continuity seems to be diverging from domestic public opinion.
In January, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists set their “Doomsday Clock” to 90 seconds before midnight, in an assessment of how close the world is to “global catastrophe”—the prospect of nuclear war. Three recent events over the past few weeks have reinforced the idea that the world is entering a dangerous era of nuclear risk.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Western governments realized that they had overestimated the power of the Russian state and underestimated the resilience of Ukraine’s. Governments must examine why certain flawed paradigms proved so persistent, in order to avoid similar miscalculations in the future.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 upended international politics, and seriously affected China’s strategic calculations. Beijing is now scrambling to limit the fallout of the conflict on its core strategic and economic interests, and with the prospects of a clear Russian victory waning by the day, China faces a dilemma.