A quick follow up on a couple of Russia posts from Monday, both via Nicolas Gros-Verheyde’s excellent French-language blog on European defense, Bruxelles 2. The EU and Russia signed the formal agreement for the Russian helicopter detachment that will participate in the EUFOR Chad mission. And the Russian navy’s upcoming Indian Ocean war games exercise is part of an increased strategic focus by Moscow on the Indian Ocean, especially off the coast of Africa.
Nikolas Gvosdev wonders out loud whether Nicolas Sarkozy is hoping to play trans-Atlantic interlocutor between America and Russia. I’ve argued before that a good deal of Sarkozy’s conciliatory posture towards the U.S. — which has gotten him accused here in France of an Atlanticist alignment with Washington — was in fact a gambit designed to make Paris the fulcrum upon which American-EU relations pivot. Sarkozy has been very careful to balance his gestures towards Washington with demands for concessions (NATO vs. EU defense, for instance), and has also not been reluctant to oppose American positions (on NATO expansion, for instance) […]
I just wanted to flag a couple Russia items that caught my eye. First, from RIA Novosti over the weekend, an anouncement that Russia and the EU will sign the agreement formalizing Russia’s participation in the EUFOR Chad mission. Russia had offered last spring to send a helicopter group, along with the units to man it, but the formal signing had yet to take place before the Georgia War froze up Russia- EU relations. The announcement came from a Russian diplomat, but if it’s accurate it would indicate that the EU has decided to compartmentalize its reaction to the Georgia […]
The most interesting aspect to the Russian navy’s latest announced exercises isn’t so much that they’re taking place, but where they’re taking place: the Indian Ocean. The strategic sea lanes that link Asia to Africa are already the object of an Indian and Chinese naval buildup, and the region was identified last summer by France’s defense white paper as a principal strategic concern. As in other aspects of its conventional military capacity, Russia has a lot of ground to make up before it represents a credible naval power. But the fact that in reestablishing its global naval presence, they’ve chosen […]