The sudden regime failures of the Shah of Iran and the USSR should be kept in mind when examining the self-inflicted disasters that Moscow and Tehran are currently struggling with. The West should remain cautious before making firm predictions that either will collapse, but prepare for a range of outcomes if they do.
Women in Iran are taking to the streets to protest the imposition of the headscarf. The protests may not necessarily signal the beginning of the end for the theocratic regime that has held power since 1979. But they highlight the schism between the regime and the Iranian population, and the limits of its hold on society.
The death of Mahsa Amini after being arrested by the Iranian police’s “guidance patrol”—tasked with enforcing the mandatory hijab law—may not seem like the kind of event that could seriously undermine the Islamic Republic’s authority. But it has set off a wave of protests that could become the largest the country has seen in years.
October will mark the one-year anniversary of the Sudanese military takeover from a transitional government created in 2019 after the overthrow of longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir. But nearly 12 months later, the country faces a stalemated transition, economic malaise and political paralysis that could cause state failure.
Once again, the fate of the Iran nuclear agreement is in limbo. While in theory a deal is still possible, in practice, the longer the negotiations to revive it drag out, the more difficult it will be for both sides to compromise. With that in mind, it’s worth revisiting the question of what a no-deal future might look like.
Egypt took another major step toward rapprochement with Qatar last week, as Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi made a two-day visit to Doha. The improved relations serve different purposes for each country, though, as Cairo looks to bolster its economy while Doha attempts to boost its diplomatic clout.
Last week’s change of government in the U.K., followed by the death of Queen Elizabeth II, put the spotlight on the country’s global role. Many regions got their share of news coverage in the memorials of Elizabeth’s life, but not the Middle East, reflecting its low importance on the list of London’s priorities.
The IAEA has found itself in the thick of two global political crises—securing a Ukrainian nuclear power plant and enforcing oversight of Iran’s nuclear program. Its chief, Rafael Grossi, has managed both files with dexterity, but his ongoing success will depend on his ability to avoid alienating any of the parties involved.
Yemen’s latest truce extension was reached with difficulty, in part because the Houthis no longer feel they have any incentive to make further concessions. With the clock already running down on the two-month extension, the group’s lack of meaningful engagement poses a serious threat to the prospects for reaching a lasting peace.
In writing Middle East Memo each week, I’ll be focusing on what is happening in the Middle East and why it matters to policymakers, analysts and lay readers alike. And in conveying a clearer picture of events in the region, I will try to situate what is going on there within the greater geopolitical landscape.
The Tokyo International Conference on African Development was held last weekend in Tunis, amid major transformations in international politics since the last conference in 2019. Japan’s efforts to expand its influence in Africa are regarded by many Africans and other observers as a model of international cooperation to be emulated.
Many Americans were reminded last week that the United States remains actively engaged in military combat. But this conflict is not in Afghanistan, where the U.S. withdrew its forces last August. Nor is it in Ukraine, where President Joe Biden has gone out of his way to avoid direct military involvement. It’s in Syria.