Unable to run in next year’s election due to the constitutional two-term limit, Indonesian President Joko Widodo will leave behind a complex legacy. Jokowi took office as a scrappy outsider to national politics pledging progressive reform. He leaves as an entrenched insider who rarely delivered on those initial promises.
In recent years, the GCC member states have made efforts to shift toward renewable energies, while turning to China as a key partner in doing so. But while that partnership has proved fruitful in terms of investments in renewables, it has also paradoxically alleviated the pressure the GCC countries feel to abandon hydrocarbons.
In the faceoff between liberal democracies and autocracies, the competing camps are enlisting backers across the globe, and Latin America has become an important battleground. Venezuela has emerged as the epicenter of activity for the anti-Western front, as highlighted by Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Caracas last week.
Almost two and a half years since the February 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military junta is losing control of much of the country. Having already lost large swathes of territory to ethnic militias and People’s Defense Militias, it now faces threats even in the biggest cities, where it had until recently maintained a degree of brutal control.
What happens in Ukraine will not stay in Ukraine. That is the essence of an argument commonly made for why the U.S. must support Kyiv in resisting Russian aggression: A failure to stop Russia will give other powers the impression that they can pursue their interests with aggressive impunity. But is that really the case?
Earlier this month, Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto proposed a plan to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. Though quickly dismissed as unfeasible by Kyiv and many Western commentators, the proposal is significant for what it reveals about Jakarta’s attempts to navigate the politics of the war in Ukraine.
In response to the war in Ukraine and amid growing tensions with China, Vietnam has doubled down on its strategy of multi-alignment, by simultaneously courting closer relations not only with the U.S. and China, but also with likeminded regional powers and neighbors. As a result, Vietnam has forged a new strategic sweet spot.
Reports that Cuba will host a Chinese spy station are likely to fuel hysterical debates in the U.S. over politics, not policy. Such a nearby facility would pose a threat that should be taken seriously. But a better debate over how the U.S. should respond would start with the correct historical analogy for what is happening today.
Last month, Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted an in-person summit with the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. The gathering was the latest demonstration of China’s growing geo-economic role in Central Asia, marking what Xi called a “new era” in Beijing’s relations with the region.
For a moment in May, former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan looked as if he was the country’s most powerful man. Having seemingly won his standoff with Pakistan’s military, Khan chided the generals, saying their coercion would achieve nothing. But for the generals, coercion achieved quite a bit. Khan’s moment on top was ephemeral.
This year’s G-7 summit made it clear the group views China and Russia as threats to the international order and offered insights into how the Western powers plan to counter them. It seems the G-7 approach has three facets: ignore Russian intimidation, economically decouple from China and court nations throughout the Global South.