Ahead of Thailand’s election, Pheu Thai, the country’s main opposition party, is gaining momentum as it looks to end nearly a decade of military-backed rule. But while a clear margin of victory would limit the military-backed regime’s ability to remain in power by legal means, it could prompt another coup or a judicial intervention.
Does the United States need Europe? That question is currently under much debate in Washington policy circles, with some arguing that the U.S. should redeploy forces, materiel and military planning away from Europe and reallocate them toward countering China. The argument has some validity, but it is ultimately unsustainable.
A rarely seen occurrence happened in Europe this week: a humbled China apologized to Europe, after the country’s ambassador to France questioned the sovereignty of post-Soviet countries. It has renewed the conversation about what could happen if Europe, armed with a unified China policy, went toe-to-toe with Beijing.
In a rare move, China’s Foreign Ministry has publicly distanced itself from statements made by a sitting ambassador after the PRC’s top envoy in Paris, Lu Shaye, suggested that none of the former Soviet republics are recognized under international law. His remarks sparked outrage in several European countries.
U.S. policy in Latin America is now strongly shaped by the question of China’s involvement and influence there. But while the U.S. will not convince countries to turn away from Beijing, it could help governments negotiate a better and more fair playing field, for China and other foreign powers operating in their countries.
Earlier this year, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio visited five G-7 countries in a bid to expand security cooperation. Combined with new security frameworks, the visits collectively signal Tokyo’s commitment to becoming a stabilizing regional force and playing a more proactive role as a global power.
French President Emmanuel Macron’s controversial visit to China earlier this month sparked widespread criticism on both sides of the Atlantic. Now, as the clamor dies down, two important questions remain that cannot easily be explained away: When it comes to China, who speaks for Europe? And where is European policy on China heading?
For years, Russia analysts have tried to make sense of President Vladimir Putin’s rule by reaching for comparisons with key moments in Russian history. Yet a more useful approach than looking to Russian history would be to compare the Putin regime with similar regimes over the past 70 years in Egypt, Pakistan and Yemen.
In early March, former Cambodian opposition leader Kem Sokha was convicted of treason and sentenced to 27 years in prison, preventing him from challenging Prime Minister Hun Sen in elections scheduled for July. Kem Sokha’s legal persecution has laid bare Hun Sen’s desire to remove any and all threats to his grip on power.
Could a coalition of non-Western countries find a pathway to peace between Russia and Ukraine? Brazilian President Lula da Silva talked up this prospect on a visit last weekend to Beijing. Along with China’s own 12-point “position paper” on ending the war, that has focused attention on non-Western powers’ potential to broker peace.
French President Emmanuel Macron embarked on a three-day state visit to China last week, during which the war in Ukraine, Europe’s ties with Beijing and trade between France and China topped his agenda. But Macron’s messaging during the trip was confusing and raised questions about his vision of European strategic autonomy.
South Korea is emblematic of East Asia’s well-documented coming demographic crisis. Yet while the issue has preoccupied successive governments, including that of current President Yoon Suk Yeol, their proposed policy responses have failed to address the root of the problem: the country’s still-pervasive traditional gender roles.
A year after mass protests forced the resignation of the government, Sri Lanka is making some progress on its economic and debt crises. But the country is not out of danger. Its humanitarian crisis is far from over, and some of the forces that helped create the catastrophe are still embedded in the country’s centers of power.
In the past year, Laos has witnessed more popular unrest than it has in decades. Under normal circumstances, the regime would typically respond to any public displays of dissent by cracking down on protesters and circling its wagons. But amid severe economic distress, many citizens are increasingly undaunted by the fear of repression.
After decades of insufficient funding, misguided investments and poor strategic planning, the U.S. has allowed its position of maritime superiority in the Indo-Pacific to slip away. As a result, China has seized the initiative to threaten not only the United States’ military position in the region, but its economic status as well.