In the upcoming midterm U.S. congressional elections, Republicans are expected to regain control of the House of Representatives and possibly the Senate, which would put them in position to undermine U.S. efforts to support Ukraine militarily. However, concerns that Republicans will do so are unfounded for three reasons.
On Oct. 6, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Prague, as part of a new effort to normalize relations. A changed geopolitical landscape in the region has removed some obstacles to a rapprochement, but the current efforts could still be derailed by other stumbling blocks.
Despite global attention on Taiwan, the state in the Indo-Pacific region facing the most difficult security dilemmas with regard to a more aggressive China under Xi Jinping is Vietnam. Hanoi is struggling to manage the adverse effects of a deterioration in bilateral relations that began when Xi first took power a decade ago.
Iran’s sale of drones to Russia and reported engagement on the ground in Ukraine could further complicate its already rocky relationship with the West. But despite this, Iran and Russia still stand to gain geopolitically and economically from an expansion of their collaboration, even if it is a partnership of convenience.
Among the many concerns raised about Russia’s war in Ukraine is that it is using tactics that constitute genocide. But when human rights advocates focus so much on the genocide label, they risk drawing attention away from actions that are as bad or worse, but also easier to punish when called “crimes against humanity.”
It is not polite, as Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas put it in June, to say, “I told you so.” But the West had a “Russia problem” long before it had a “Putin problem.” The Baltic states warned Europe and the rest of the world about this. The world didn’t listen. And Ukrainians have paid a horrible price as a result.
The news that Russia has begun to employ Iranian military equipment, particularly kamikaze attack drones, in its war against Ukraine has led some observers to frame that conflict as a proving ground for Iran’s military technology. But the implications for military dynamics in the Middle East are far from clear.
Until recently, many observers expected the war in Ukraine would end with a deal, once the equilibrium point between Russia’s military setbacks in Ukraine and Europe’s growing economic crisis was found. The events of the past month have called into question whether such an equilibrium can and will be reached.
The Nobel Peace Prize committee’s flawed decisions over the years have contributed to list after list of “the worst Nobel laureates,” a phenomenon that even the prize committee itself has acknowledged. Despite all these unforced errors and shortcomings, however, the Nobel Peace Prize matters and should still be given.
NATO defense ministers pledged more air defense systems for Ukraine and strongly condemned Russia’s targeting of Ukrainian civilians in missile attacks in response to the bombing of a bridge in Crimea last week. But Kyiv continues to complain that some EU countries are not doing enough to deliver military aid quickly enough.
As European countries prepared for a sharp drop in natural gas supplies and an impending energy crisis, the Netherlands announced it would slash production at one of the world’s largest natural gas fields. The announcement reflects the competing priorities across Europe, pitting climate goals against the energy crisis.
Russia’s annexation of four partially occupied areas in Ukraine would appear to turn the U.N. Charter on its head, prompting some observers to wonder whether it has outlived its usefulness. In fact, however, the charter is working exactly as was envisioned, and perhaps even better than its framers hoped, for three reasons.
The scale of the military effort in support of Ukraine’s struggle for survival has provided stark evidence of how distorted U.S. and European defense priorities have been over the past two decades. The war in Ukraine has served as a reminder that the U.S. and Europe must fundamentally reassess how they prepare for war.
OPEC+ announced last week that it will cut oil production by 2 million barrels per day starting in November, driving up prices globally. The U.S. responded by framing the cuts to oil production as a nakedly self-serving move that will benefit Russia, singling out Saudi Arabia as the ringleader of that collective effort.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine marked an opportunity for Germany and Poland to converge around their shared interests in the face of a common threat. But developments since then have resurfaced the many lingering questions regarding the two countries’ differences, which often reflect broader divides across the continent.
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba began a 10-day visit across Africa this week that was billed as an attempt to “better explain Ukraine.” It’s a welcome change of pace from Kyiv, whose engagement with Africa amid the war has consisted of diplomatic improprieties and unfamiliarity with African diplomatic positions.
Russia unleashing the destructive power of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine would be catastrophic, but not solely because of the physical damage the weapon would cause. Instead, Russia’s use of a nuclear weapon would be catastrophic because it would cause us to enter a new world, one transformed in three permanent ways.