A recent spate of commentary has drawn the analogy between today’s regional conflicts and those of the 1930s that led to World War II, often as a cautionary tale for how to deal with contemporary international security dynamics. These analogies, however, misread the past, with potentially dangerous implications for the present.
Censorship of local Russian media, combined with diminished access for foreign reporters, has narrowed our understanding of the war in Ukraine’s impact on Russian communities outside big cities. Yet even with these limits, there are significant signals that undermine the image of invincibility the Putin regime works so hard to project.
Recent developments in the U.S. have reinvigorated the debate over Europe’s ability to defend itself. Now, after having relied for decades on U.S. support while collectively free-riding on U.S. capabilities, Europeans will have to shoulder a much more significant burden in European security themselves in the foreseeable future.
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni used the annual Italy-Africa gathering—upgraded to a summit this year—to strategically frame her government’s new approach to Africa. However, the inherent contradictions of the event were not entirely concealed, revealing challenges that will necessitate nuanced approaches to resolve.
Former U.S. President Donald Trump upended what was once a relatively staid global economic and trade system. For all of the upheaval he created, though, Trump left office with only one clear-cut accomplishment: an updated NAFTA deal. And even as Trump sowed chaos in America’s trade relationships, most of the world reinforced its commitment to trade liberalization.
European governments are seeking to deepen their oil and gas partnerships with Libya, largely to diversify away from Russian supplies. Yet by neglecting internal challenges such as political discord, corruption and militias, they may jeopardize their own objectives as well as Libya’s path to stability and economic recovery.
When the U.N. convenes Friday to mark the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the events may feel a little low-key. One reason is that many U.N. members want to focus on other issues. The second is that the West’s failure to support a cease-fire in the Israel-Hamas war has alienated a lot of non-Western representatives.
The latest European Union leaders meeting was the perfect illustration of how the far-right parties that are gaining popularity across the continent may converge in their positions on most domestic issues, particularly immigration, but remain sharply divided over the question of supporting Ukraine amid its war with Russia.
Alexei Navalny’s death last week fueled despair among dissidents and emigres struggling to break President Vladimir Putin’s grip on Russia. Now, unless other leading activists can move quickly to revive the remnants of Russia’s democratic opposition, their influence is likely to fade away for the foreseeable future.
Nearly two years into Ukraine’s war with Russia, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made a major change last week, replacing the commander of the Ukrainian military. While we do not know the exact reason for the change, it is also unsurprising—without a clear path to military victory, a rethink of Ukraine’s strategy is necessary.
Last week, negotiations in the Netherlands to form a government led by Geert Wilders and his Euroskeptic, anti-immigrant party collapsed, leaving the country’s political future uncertain. But even as Wilders’ chances of forging a strong governing coalition seemed to crumble, polls show he has become more popular than ever.
The recent panic over European military self-reliance has fostered an internal shift in attitudes toward the EU among far-right movements. As they warm to a more-powerful Brussels in the hope that they can shape the EU’s agenda, what once seemed like clear ideological battlelines have become increasingly blurred.
The International Court of Justice last week agreed to take up the question of whether Ukraine was committing genocide in the war against Russia. The ruling may have surprised some observers, but Ukraine actually asked the ICJ to rule on its own conduct in order to decisively repudiate Russia’s justification for invading.
Hungarian Prime Minister Orban’s capitulation in his standoff with the EU over aid to Ukraine revealed the extent to which his embrace of anti-liberal culture wars is a tactical gambit he is willing to ditch whenever it is necessary to protect EU handouts that fund the corrupt patronage networks on which his regime relies.
Last week’s defeat of a controversial amnesty measure underscores the difficulties facing Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez. Having deftly engineered an improbable return to office after last year’s elections, Sanchez now finds himself at the head of a coalition even more unruly than his previous complex, multiparty alliance.