Nairobi’s Operation Linda Nchi, or Protect the Country, was launched in October as a counterterrorism measure after kidnappings of foreign tourists and aid workers inside of Kenya were linked to the Somalian militant group al-Shabaab. For a country that has seen lucrative tourism revenues, especially from cruise ship visits, dry up in the wake of the instability emanating from Somalia, the abductions were the last straw. But an unintended side benefit of the intervention has been its impact on piracy. In the face of the military operation, with Kenyan army units pushing up toward the port of Kismayo, Somali pirate groups are scrambling to wrap up their activities, even slashing ransom demands for ships and crews that they continue to hold in an effort to “to close deals before a battle between the militants and Kenyan forces.”
Contrast this with the efforts of a multinational naval presence that includes units from the United States, the European Union, Russia, China, Korea and India, specifically tasked with curbing Somali piracy. While some safe corridors have been created and some attacks deterred, pirate attacks in the region have been on the rise every year since the first task forces were deployed.
Kenya is by no means a major military power. Yet, its army seems to have put a dent in pirate operations after several weeks, something that several years of expensive naval deployments by other countries failed to do. This development raises two larger questions.