Two developments this week illustrated the "one step forward, one step back" nature of global nuclear nonproliferation efforts. On the one hand, Iran announced further progress in its domestic nuclear program, increasing Tehran's potential ability to make nuclear weapons should it ultimately decide to do so. On the other, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) took an important step toward
discouraging the further spread of uranium-enrichment technologies, which could be used to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities, by voting to establish the first completely multinational nuclear fuel bank. Although the IAEA move will not solve the immediate
problem presented by Iran, it may help avert future proliferation problems by decreasing the further spread of sensitive uranium-enrichment technologies that can be misused for military purposes,
On Sunday, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi,
told reporters that Iran was now self-sufficient in making uranium yellowcake, a necessary precursor material in the uranium-enrichment process. Salehi said the domestically produced uranium yellowcake, shipped from Iran's Gachin mine under IAEA supervision, would be used in Iran's uranium-conversion facility at Isfahan.
This development will further alarm those countries already concerned about Iran's growing nuclear capacities. Iran's shortage of domestic uranium was one factor constraining the pace of its nuclear progress. If the claims about yellowcake production are confirmed, then Iran will have developed at least some capacity in all key elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, reducing the leverage of Russia and other foreign nuclear partners on its efforts -- and possibly crossing an Israeli red line for triggering some kind of military action.
The announcement followed the
assassination of two Iranian nuclear scientists last week, and came on the eve of yesterday's resumption of EU-led high-level nuclear discussions with Iran, which have been in abeyance for more than a year. EU foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton is leading the P5+1 negotiating partners -- Britain, France, Germany, China, Russia, and the United States -- in a meeting with Iran's top nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili in Geneva on Dec. 6-7.
Since the last meeting in October 2009, the international community has imposed additional international sanctions on Iran, although their effect is difficult to assess. Although Iran appears to be suffering various economic and other costs, few expect the talks
to deliver significant progress.
The problem with Iran's uranium-enrichment program is that the technologies involved can inherently be used for both civilian and military purposes. Centrifuges can enrich natural uranium to the low levels required by most civilian power reactors, allowing countries to use nuclear energy to generate electricity, desalinate sea water, create medical isotopes, and other peaceful purposes. But they can also be used to enrich the uranium to the higher levels needed to make fissile material for nuclear weapons.
Years of past efforts to impose mandatory bans on the further spread of uranium enrichment and other sensitive dual-use nuclear technologies have encountered insurmountable resistance from developing countries. Many of these countries believe that the NPT guarantees their right to acquire all nuclear technologies, provided the equipment is used solely for non-military purposes, as confirmed by compliance with mandatory IAEA safeguards. They also do not want to remain forever dependent on U.S., Russian, and European countries for their nuclear fuel supplies, to avoid being vulnerable to artificially high prices or joint embargo measures that could potentially shut down the targeted country's expensive nuclear power plants.
Nuclear fuel banks and other multilateral fuel-cycle arrangements seek to circumvent this problem by relying on market incentives to discourage states from developing indigenous nuclear fuel cycles. The assumption underpinning these proposals is that guaranteed access for NPT-compliant countries to nuclear fuel at modest cost would be more attractive than developing expensive and proliferation-problematic enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. The logical corollary is that a country that nevertheless persisted in pursuing sensitive domestic nuclear technologies despite the higher financial costs involved would raise suspicions over whether its ultimate intentions were peaceful.
A combination of factors -- including Iran's persistent development of its uranium-enrichment capabilities despite widespread foreign opposition, an anticipated surge in the demand for nuclear energy, and some pioneering Russian initiatives -- have finally generated sufficient support for the international fuel bank concept as a way to prevent the spread of proliferation-prone technologies.
Russia already launched the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) at Angarsk in September 2007. However, the center resembles more an international joint stock venture than a genuine multilateral nuclear fuel-service center. In addition to sharing in any profits generated by the center, states that purchase shares with money or donations of uranium are entitled to use the center's services and have some say in its management. But the center's enrichment equipment is operated by Russia, with little IAEA involvement. Thus far, only countries that already have deep nuclear ties with Russia -- Armenia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine -- have become partial owners in the center.
This March, Rosatom -- the Russian Federation's state atomic energy corporation -- joined with the IAEA to establish an international low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel reserve to be housed at the IUEC. The reserve, which will come under
IAEA safeguards and monitoring, consists of 120 tons of uranium enriched to between 2 percent and 5 percent, enough to fuel two standard 1,000 megawatt reactors. The Russian government donated the initial fuel reserve, worth roughly $250 million, and will also cover the costs of operating the bank. The fuel depository would allow states that lose access to uranium fuel for reasons unrelated to contract violations or NPT noncompliance to purchase emergency LEU supplies from the bank's reserves at market prices.
Now, however, states still concerned about depending on Russia or another foreign government for their nuclear fuel will have a more genuinely multinational option. On Dec. 3, after years of divisive debate, the IAEA's Board of Governors finally agreed to create an international low-enriched uranium fuel bank. In addition to an initial $50 million pledge from American billionaire Warren Buffett, the European Union, Kuwait, Norway, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States also committed to provide collectively more than $100 million in matching funds.
The IAEA Secretariat now must decide where to locate the new fuel bank, how it will be organized, and the procedures by which it will loan fuel to applicants. It also must consider how to integrate the new bank with the two Russian arrangements as well as the dozen or so other proposals presently under consideration.
In the past, some advocates for such a fuel bank
had wanted (.pdf) to allow only countries that had abstained from developing indigenous enrichment facilities to access the bank. They
had also hoped (.pdf) that all existing national fuel-making facilities would eventually come under multinational control.
It now looks like participation in the bank will be open to any state that is in compliance with its agency safeguards obligations. According to
the restricted document obtained by the Associate Press, "the rights of Member States, including establishing or expanding their own production capacity in the nuclear fuel cycle, shall remain intact and shall not in any way be compromised or diminished by the establishment of international assurance of supply mechanisms."
The concession was perhaps necessary to overcome opposition to the bank's creation from those who feared that it would disrupt existing fuel-supply arrangements or impinge on states' ability to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. But it will nevertheless limit the multinational initiative's ability to constrain unilateral efforts to acquire sensitive nuclear duel-use technologies, which could later be misused to make nuclear weapons.
Richard Weitz is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor. His weekly WPR column,
Global Insights, appears every Tuesday.
Photo: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad touring Iran's uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, Iran, 2008 (Photo by the Web site of the president of Iran).
