The latest row between Washington and Riyadh over the decision by OPEC+ to cut oil production is not just a dispute over oil prices. It is a more fundamental divide between the U.S. and most of its Middle East security partners over what’s at stake in the war in Ukraine, and how each side sees the current geopolitical map.
In the upcoming midterm U.S. congressional elections, Republicans are expected to regain control of the House of Representatives and possibly the Senate, which would put them in position to undermine U.S. efforts to support Ukraine militarily. However, concerns that Republicans will do so are unfounded for three reasons.
More than 7.1 million Venezuelans have now fled the country, making the exodus the largest migration crisis in the world. But while most Venezuelan migrants had previously sought a safe haven in other countries in South America, migration patterns have shifted toward the U.S. under the false hope that things will be better there.
Iran’s sale of drones to Russia and reported engagement on the ground in Ukraine could further complicate its already rocky relationship with the West. But despite this, Iran and Russia still stand to gain geopolitically and economically from an expansion of their collaboration, even if it is a partnership of convenience.
With U.S. President Joe Biden’s latest escalation of the U.S.-China trade war, it’s clear the world is a far cry from the “Golden Age” of economic globalization that marked the 1990s and early 2000s. So how did globalization’s “golden age” come to a halt? Three major factors contributed to the global economy’s fragility.
Last week, the Mexican government filed the second of two lawsuits against the firearms business in the U.S., claiming that a handful of gun shops and distributors knowingly and deliberately violate U.S. law. Could Mexico, where arms trafficked from the U.S. are a major contributor to violence, succeed where U.S. gun control advocates have failed?
The rise and decline of the West’s strategic commitment to Indochina from the 1950s to the 1970s should be kept in mind when examining U.S. and European relations with the Gulf monarchies today. Though ties between the two sides are still extensive, U.S. and European policymakers are reassessing their commitment to the region.
Lebanon and Israel reached a historic agreement last week settling a years-long maritime border dispute involving major energy fields in the Mediterranean Sea. The agreement paves the way for the two countries to cooperate on gas extraction, but it stops short of a full Lebanese diplomatic recognition of Israel.
NATO defense ministers pledged more air defense systems for Ukraine and strongly condemned Russia’s targeting of Ukrainian civilians in missile attacks in response to the bombing of a bridge in Crimea last week. But Kyiv continues to complain that some EU countries are not doing enough to deliver military aid quickly enough.
Last week, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued new regulations restricting the sale of semiconductors and cutting-edge chip-making equipment to China. For while the implementation of these far-reaching measures will require international cooperation, Beijing’s technology ambitions are still set to hit rougher waters.
Between October 2021 and August 2022, U.S. authorities at the U.S.-Mexico border took undocumented migrants into custody more than 2 million times—a record number that has generated nonstop commentary about a “border crisis.” But the numbers fail to convey a dramatic shift in the migrant population over the past nine years.
The scale of the military effort in support of Ukraine’s struggle for survival has provided stark evidence of how distorted U.S. and European defense priorities have been over the past two decades. The war in Ukraine has served as a reminder that the U.S. and Europe must fundamentally reassess how they prepare for war.
The novel coronavirus caught many world leaders unprepared, despite consistent warnings that a global pandemic was inevitable. And it has revealed the flaws in a global health architecture headed by the World Health Organization, which had already been faulted for its response to the 2014 Ebola pandemic in West Africa. Will there be an overhaul of the WHO when the pandemic is over?
Some observers have suggested that celebrities using their status to catalyze political involvement by their fans represents a new kind of celebrity activism, with more of an emphasis on inspiring action than taking action. But is that the case? And can celebrity activists, in inspiring such action, actually make a difference?
OPEC+ announced last week that it will cut oil production by 2 million barrels per day starting in November, driving up prices globally. The U.S. responded by framing the cuts to oil production as a nakedly self-serving move that will benefit Russia, singling out Saudi Arabia as the ringleader of that collective effort.
Western expatriates in China have shaped perceptions of the country to the point of sometimes overshadowing the country itself, but their experiences exist under a protective umbrella of privilege that is often out of touch with the experiences of so many other foreign-born workers and Chinese citizens working overseas.
Saudi King Salman issued a royal order last week to make his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, prime minister. While the position is symbolic, it consolidates the crown prince’s de facto control of Saudi Arabia and guarantees him sovereign immunity, staving off legal action against him in a U.S. courtroom.