Essebsi Must Work With Islamists to Ensure Tunisia’s Transition

Editor’s Note: This is the second of a two-part briefing on Tunisia’s elections. Part I looked at the state of democratic transition with the rise of the Nedaa Tunis party. Part II focuses on economic issues and whether Tunisia’s progress is sustainable.

Despite Tunisia’s success navigating its political transition by holding peaceful, fair elections, the challenges of keeping it sustainable remain enormous. If Tunisia’s newly elected leaders don’t deal with those challenges carefully, they could undermine the steady progress Tunisia has made over the past four years. The most alarming issue is the absence of a clear economic agenda in the election campaigns of both Beji Caid Essebsi, now the president, and his predecessor, Moncef Marzouki. In a Pew survey released in October, 96 percent of respondents said that “improved economic conditions are very important for Tunisia’s future.” Tunisia still faces enormous economic hurdles, and while both campaigns promised to focus on the economy, they ultimately left audiences confused about how exactly it would be addressed.

Although the Nedaa Tunis party has yet to form a government, the emerging alliances do not send a comforting economic message. The party closest in orientation to Nedaa Tunis’s liberal economic platform is, in fact, Ennahda, the Islamist party that has risen and fallen since the ouster of former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Due to its fierce political rivalry with Ennahda, Nedaa Tunis is leaning instead toward a coalition with mostly leftist parties like the Popular Front, or Al-Jabha, which came in fourth in October’s parliamentary elections with 15 seats, and seeking the support of groups such as the powerful Tunisian General Labor Union, which prefers maintaining a protectionist economy. The ideological contradictions within such a coalition mean it would be more likely to further muddle the Tunisian economy than improve it by attracting needed foreign investment, encouraging entrepreneurship and small business ownership and engaging in aggressive banking and labor law reforms.

In addition to a lack of any clear economic strategy, the elections also highlighted the continued, severe polarization and ideological divide between Tunisia’s liberal and Islamists parties. As Monica Marks of Oxford University has shown, Tunisia’s civil society has a tendency to fear Islamism more than authoritarianism. Liberal and leftist parties hold deep anti-Islamist attitudes that are likely to impact the political map and formation of alliances in the post-election period. When asked about his future political alliances, Essebsi stated that his party “will govern with those closest to us, with the democratic family, so to speak.” Rim Mahjoub of Afek Tunis, a secular party that secured a fifth-best eight seats in the parliamentary elections, said that her party would prefer a coalition without Ennahda. Other leftists take an even more radical position against the Islamists: Mongi Rahoui of the leftist Popular Front said that allying with Ennahda “is a red line for us. If Ennahda is in the government, it means we are in the opposition.”

Such attitudes have carried over from the campaign, when Ennahda argued that Nedaa Tunis represented the return of authoritarianism, while the latter claimed that an Ennahda win would be a victory for radicalization and extremism. Both parties played on voters’ fears rather than the hope of building a new Tunisia that drove protesters when they revolted in late 2010.

Moreover, despite the smooth election, Nedaa Tunis’ decisive win still carries risks of destabilization. With the presidency and a plurality in parliament, the party is likely to form and lead the government—in theory, that shouldn’t be a problem. But in such a polarized country that is just exiting a half-century of autocracy and with reactionary forces ascendant in the region, the temptation and possibility for power grabs is high—consider Egypt. Also, Nedaa Tunis’ structure could present a challenge to democracy. Essebsi formed the party in 2012 to represent the interests of ideologically diverse stakeholders that lack shared goals beyond ousting Ennahda. As Danya Greenfield of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East explained, “Without a unifying vision beyond an anti-Ennahda stance, Nedaa could collapse under pressure.” And how will Essebsi, with his controversial past, deal with vital issues like transitional justice and truth-seeking about the old regime? Tunisia has already formed a Truth and Dignity Commission to investigate past crimes and human rights violations, for which Essebsi could be implicated.

To successfully manage Tunisia’s complex transition, Essebsi needs to address the challenges head-on. First and foremost, that means delivering on the economy. Tunisians have been waiting for economic progress since they ousted Ben Ali, and thus far have not revolted against subsequent governments, but their patience is being tested. Essebsi will not be able to fix the economy alone; he needs to reach out to other political players in Tunisia—most of all Ennahda.

Nedaa Tunis would be best served by forming a strong government that includes its Islamist opponent. Together, the two parties would be able to engage in serious economic reforms, united by their similar liberal economic orientations. According to Greenfield, the two parties are likely to agree on key economic reforms including “liberalization of the banking sector, streamlining of business registration, tax reform that would address the informal economy, and revision of labor laws that limit ability of employers to hire and fire.” It is not in Nedaa Tunis’ interest to keep the still-powerful Ennahda outside the government, since pushing Ennahda into the opposition would leave Nedaa to rely on a fragile coalition of smaller parties, each with its own political and economic priorities, thus making it harder for Nedaa Tunis to actually govern.

Nedaa Tunis should also be aware that controlling both the legislative and executive branches comes with great responsibility—and can be a liability. The party should learn from the mistakes of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and avoid exercising unilateral control during this crucial, tenuous period. Essebsi, for his part, must also resist any temptation to feed into the regional polarization of Islamists versus anti-Islamists, which is raging next door in Libya, as well as Egypt. He should preserve Tunisia’s role as a progressive trailblazer in the Arab world, rather than follow a dangerous regional trend.

Now is the time for Nedaa Tunis to rebuild Tunisia inclusively to provide the concrete economic results Tunisians are growing tired of waiting for. The gap between Essebsi and Marzouki is not as wide as the media or campaigns suggest; working together is possible. As political analyst Youssef Cherif told Al Jazeera, at the end of the day, “Essebsi is not the Sisi of Tunisia,”referring to the current Egyptian president, “and Marzouqi is not the Che Guevara of Tunisia, neither.” Now that it is in power, Nedaa Tunis must demonstrate that it is more committed to rebuilding Tunisia than tearing down a political rival. If it does that, the party will further set Tunisia apart as a model for the Arab world.

Dr. Ibrahim Sharqieh is a foreign policy fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Doha Center and Conflict Resolution Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University in Qatar. Contact him at sharqieh@gmail.com, and follow him @sharqieh.