Strategic Posture Review: Australia

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Australia sits within two geostrategic landscapes: It is an active member of the global Anglo-American alliance, while also being part of the Asia-Pacific region. In the past, Australia’s cultural, political and economic referents linked it closely to Britain and the United States. In terms of security, Australia was historically “protected” by the British Empire. With the empire’s rapid unraveling from 1942 onward, followed by Britain’s realignment with Europe, Australia sought protection from the United States.

However, Australia is also geographically part of the Asia Pacific. While Australia was able to isolate itself from its neighbors for most of its existence, global changes since the 1960s and 1970s have forced it to engage with Asia. As a result, Australian security patterns have begun to promote regional engagement with its neighbors, while maintaining historic ties with its “great and powerful” friends.

In the late 1980s, even before the end of the Cold War, Australia began to shift away from its traditional reliance on the protection of a “great and powerful friend,” exploring instead multilateral security approaches that sought security with Asia rather than security from Asia. During this period, Australia supported the development of multilateral, cooperative security structures for the Asia-Pacific region — principally the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the “second track” Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).

While there was general support in Australian government circles for the multilateral approach, especially the ARF, some doubts remained as to its effectiveness in delivering regional peace and stability over the short to medium term. As a result, Australia retained its bilateral defense arrangements as a means of decreasing the likelihood of a military threat emerging from Asia. All post-War Australian defense and foreign policy statements, for instance, have clearly characterized the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and United States) alliance as a key element of Australia’s policy.

More recently, following its election in 1996, the Howard coalition government sought to deepen its ties with the U.S.[1] In July 1996, at the first Australia-U.S. ministerial consultations (AUSMIN) between the U.S. and Australian defense and foreign ministers, the two countries issued the “Sydney Declaration,” which announced a reinvigoration of their alliance. Describing the U.S. and Australia as “natural allies,” the declaration reinforced the Howard government’s image as a stalwart of U.S. interests in the region.[2]

Australian critics of the government saw this as a return to the previously abandoned policy of “Forward Defense,” where Australia sought to protect itself from hostile regional forces through a combination of closely aligning itself with the U.S. and actively engaging threats before they posed a direct menace to Australian national interests. But Australia’s close relationship with the U.S. is neither unwarranted, nor does it have an entirely negative impact on Australia’s relations with Southeast Asian states. Indeed most of the states in Southeast Asia support the U.S. military and strategic presence as a stabilizing element in the region, and value Australia’s role in supporting and securing this commitment.

Changes with the New Government

Following its election in November 2007, the Rudd Labor government initiated what it refers to as a long-term reform agenda for Australia’s defense and security policy, to better secure Australia across a “complex array of national security challenges.”[3] This reform process began with the commissioning in February 2008 of a new defense white paper. While the paper was initially due to be released in November of that year, it was delayed and was released on May 2, 2009. The second step in the reform process occurred in December 2008, when Prime Minister Kevin Rudd presented the very first National Security Statement (NSS) to the Australian Parliament.

The NSS seeks to provide a coherent and coordinated framework for Australia’s national security by providing strategic guidance for all of the various government departments and agencies involved. Its objective is to set the context for the upcoming defense and counterterrorism white papers, as well as for a planned series of regular foreign policy statements meant to replace the Howard government’s two foreign policy white papers. The NSS is also guiding the development of the government’s first National Energy Security Assessment due later in the year.[4]

The new defense white paper sets out the foundations of Australia’s future defense capabilities. To do so, it addresses the two main dilemmas facing Australian strategic policy. The first concerns whether Australia’s primary security role should be as an active partner in the wider U.S.-led global security effort, or whether Australia should instead seek to focus more on an independent role within the Asia-Pacific region.

Historically Australia has sought protection from external threats through the patronage of a “great and powerful” friend. It was argued that in order to guarantee that this great and powerful friend would come to Australia’s aid in times of crisis, or to ensure that the friend would maintain an active role in the region to prevent a hostile great power from dominating, Australians needed to offer their assistance when that friend needed help in other parts of the world.

This was partially the rationale for Australia’s deployment, in support of the British Empire, to South Africa during the Boer War, to France and the Middle East during World War I, and to Europe, North Africa and the Pacific during WWII. During the Cold War, Australia also participated in the Malay Emergency, the Korean War, the Konfrontasi between Indonesia and Malaysia and Singapore — again as part of the British Empire’s forces — and then in the Vietnam War, the first Gulf War, and interventions in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq as part of U.S.-led “coalitions of the willing.”

Australia’s need to participate in these global conflicts was influenced by its sense of isolation as a Western power in the Asia-Pacific region. In the immediate post-War era, the main concern was over a potentially remilitarized Japan. But the global Communist threat from the Soviet Union and — after 1949 — the regional threat from Communist China quickly overtook fears of Japanese aggression. In addition, although a direct military threat from Indonesia remained an unlikely worst-case scenario, Australia could not ignore the potential danger represented by mass refugee flows across the Timor and Arafura Seas.

The second principal dilemma that the defense white paper will need to address reflects the tension that exists between factions within the Australian defense and security community over the nature of future threats. Most agree that Australia needs to maintain a full range of operational capabilities and that the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) core mission will remain the defense of Australia. But there is a debate over what emphasis should be placed on the various ends of the “spectrum of operations,” which extend from lower level operations such as assisting with emergency relief, to higher level operations that deal with threats to national survival. The official position is that policy will be guided by the concept of “likelihood versus consequence,” whereby operations at the lower end of the spectrum are more likely, but their consequences are relatively limited. Alternatively, for those operations at the higher end of the spectrum, while they might be relatively unlikely, their consequences may be catastrophic.[5]

Following the end of the Cold War, the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific — and in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Island states in particular — changed dramatically. Two new trends emerged to cause strategic concern in Australia. The first was the growing pattern of crisis and instability among many of the Pacific Island states, as well as the potential for political instability to spark separatist movements throughout Indonesia. Since 2001, the threat of global and regional terrorism has reinforced the image of an arc of instability stretching across Australia’s northern neighbors.

The second trend was the changing strategic outlook in the wider Asia-Pacific as a result of the rise of China.[6] The implications of China’s economic growth and its military modernization program — in particular, the growth of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the Chinese acquisition of advanced fighter jets from Russia — combined with a period of increased tensions between China and the U.S. over the future of Taiwan and the growing influence of China in the Asia-Pacific in general — and Southeast Asia in particular — have led to increased concern over the role that China will seek to play over the next 20-30 years.

For Australian policymakers, the debate centers around the need for significant spending on weapons and weapon systems designed to engage a conventional threat in the maritime security environment of the Asia-Pacific, versus the need to focus more on full-spectrum operations, both locally and globally. The views of the former group were articulated by the upcoming defense white paper’s principal author, Department of Defence Deputy Secretary for Coordination and Governance Mike Pezzullo. Pezzullo argues that tensions between China and the U.S. posed a greater security threat to Australia than the war on terrorism, and that the implications of great-power miscalculation leading to regional or even global wars are too disastrous to ignore. As a consequence, defense planning needs to look beyond the current war against terrorism:

“If you configure your force structure for the preoccupations of the next couple of years, you would end up with a light-scale, almost gendarme [force] with a heavy quotient of special forces undertaking al-Qaida manhunts. You have to keep your eye on the fact that we live in a predominantly maritime environment and state-on-state issues might well come back into play.”[7]

On the other hand, those who see the need for greater capability to engage at the lower end of the spectrum argue that the threat of great power confrontation is overstated. While China has engaged in a military modernization program over the past decade, it is essentially defensive in nature. The Chinese are building their maritime power capabilities to allow it to protect their growing reliance on overseas trade and commerce. The Australian Defence Force, this group argues, should be better prepared to participate in the types of combat operations that it has actually been engaged in over the past four decades — that is, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and counterinsurgency operations.

Evolution of Australia’s Foreign and Defense Policies

Since the end of the Cold War, Australia has pursued its security through a series of bilateral security arrangements. The most important of these is the ANZUS alliance, but Australia also maintains several bilateral security dialogue agreements with the People’s Republic of China, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, New Zealand, Thailand, Vietnam and Russia. It also has defense cooperation agreements with India, the U.K. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[8]

Australia has also sought multilateral approaches to security and is a member of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group, the ARF and the East Asia Summit (EAS).[9] Moreover, since coming to office, the Rudd government has promoted the idea of establishing by 2020 a new region-wide security organization — the Asia-Pacific Community — that would engage in the full spectrum of dialogue, cooperation and action on economic, political and security issues. While the proposal was widely criticized by regional commentators, the failure of the existing regional architecture to deal with crises such as the recent political unrest in Thailand has reportedly increased support, at least from some of the ASEAN states.[10]

To ensure regional stability, the government has emphasized policies based upon the bilateral Australia-U.S. collective defense alliance. This relationship was intensified following the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, with Australia for the first time invoking the ANZUS Treaty in response to the attacks. Australia subsequently sent troops to Afghanistan, and deployed its largest military force since the Vietnam War as part of the coalition that invaded Iraq. In addition, it was an early and active participant in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative, hosting the second plenary meeting in Brisbane in July 2003, and hosting a major exercise in April 2006.

While the U.S. relationship is important, it is not the only one Australia pursues to ensure that the Asia-Pacific remains a stable and peaceful region. The level and type of engagement Australia has with other Asia-Pacific states, however, is dependent upon their relative geographical position vis-à-vis Australia. The states in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, which are not considered a direct threat to Australia, are the focal point of Australia’s defense and security cooperation programs. These states also serve as a buffer between Australia and the more difficult states that lie beyond.

In Southeast Asia, Australia pursues “strategic partnerships” that emphasize bilateral cooperation — especially in terms of strategic planning, industry and science — in order to enhance Southeast Asia’s capacity to rebuff hostile influences that could threaten Australia’s security. Australian engagement in the Southwest Pacific follows similar lines, but also includes defense cooperation strategies designed to promote internal peace and stability and contain any potential intra-area disputes. Defense cooperation projects there seek to develop the defense capabilities and professional standards appropriate to the legitimate defense needs of the Southwest Pacific states. They include strategic exchanges, combined exercises, and cooperation in logistics, science and industry, and equipment acquisition.

As for the states in Northeast and South Asia, Australia engages in “constructive contact” to increase Australia’s understanding of these states’ interests in the nearer region, and to enhance their understanding of Australia’s role in promoting regional security initiatives.

Previously, Australian defense policy during the Cold War era tended to focus on building a larger army supported by smaller air and naval forces that could be deployed to conflict zones regionally or globally as part of a U.S.-led coalition force. This notion of Forward Defence, where Australia would engage hostile forces far from home in an attempt to prevent them from eventually threatening Australia directly, was seen as vital to Australian security.

With the election of the Whitlam Labor government in December 1972, Australia officially dropped the policy of Forward Defence and initiated a policy of “self-reliance.” The risk of a direct attack on Australia within a 10-year period was seen as “remote and improbable,” and while the U.S. alliance was not formally abandoned, greater emphasis was placed on Australia’s relations with its Asian neighbors. Australia’s strategic policy in this era focused on increased diplomatic engagement with the region rather than on defense strategies in the event of an attack.

Even with election of the Fraser coalition government in 1975, little comprehensive analysis of Australia’s defense requirements was undertaken. Procurement and acquisition policy was allowed to drift, and interservice rivalries tended to focus on replacement needs rather than grand strategy formulation. The most important transformation during this period was the decision to reform the bureaucratic structures of the Australian military and government departments into the Australian Defence Force and the Department of Defence respectively.

In 1986-7, under the Hawke Labor government, a new strategic review and subsequent defense white paper saw the development of the “Defense of Australia” strategy, whereby Australia adopted a policy of “self-reliance within the framework of alliances and regional associations.” Despite being written during the Cold War, the 1986 Dibb Review and the 1987 defense white paper stressed the relative security of Australia as a state: It had no aggressive neighbors; was not situated on any strategic route; the risk of a global war between the U.S. and Soviet Union was low; and, Australia’s geographic isolation made it difficult to attack. Concluding that Australia did not face a direct military threat for at least 10 years, the new policy argued that rather than planning for a major war, it should instead prepare to engage in lower level conflict.

On the other hand, the Australian Defence Force was poorly structured and organized. The Defense of Australia posture would require a “core force” that could subsequently be expanded in times of crisis. But any potential attack on the homeland would have to come through the Indonesian archipelago and need to cross the air-sea gap off the north coast of Australia. The Australian military forces, meanwhile, were generally located in the southeast of the country, in and around the major metropolitan centers of Sydney and Melbourne.

The need was therefore two-fold: first, to acquire air and sea forces able to engage hostile forces in the air-sea gap; and second, to move the ADF to the northern and western parts of Australia. In addition to the purchase of advanced F/A-18 Hornet fighter aircraft, P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft and ANZAC patrol frigates, the major acquisition project of this period was to develop the defense infrastructure in northern and western Australia and the development of the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) — an over-the-horizon radar system covering an area of roughly 37,000 square kilometers to the north and west of Australia.

A decade after the end of the Cold War, defense and security policymakers in Australia began to question the force structures and operational policies of self-reliance and the Defence of Australia strategy. The regional crisis over East Timor’s independence movement in 1999 and the Australian-led, U.N. peace-enforcement mission to East Timor later that year led policymakers to consider adapting the ADF to conduct more regional-based missions across the entire spectrum of operations.

In the 2000 defense white paper, the government announced a shift away from the decades-old policy of Defence of Australia to one where the ADF develops more offensive-minded capabilities. It articulated a more proactive military strategy that would allow Australia to control its maritime approaches, attack “hostile forces as far from our shores as possible,” deploy preponderant force into Australia’s immediate neighborhood, and make a substantial contribution to any coalition in Southeast Asia. In light of the changed strategic environment following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S, the 2003 and 2005 strategic reviews and the 2007 defense update announced further restructuring of the ADF, increasing the size of the Army to six battalions. The goal was to create an ADF that is adaptable and versatile in meeting and sustaining the demands of diverse operations and coalitions, be they in the immediate neighborhood or further afield.

Future Force Structures

The capabilities of the ADF have been enhanced through a procurement plan that adopted a “balanced force” structure and improved its ability to engage in missions across the spectrum of operations, far from Australian shores, acting independently or in coalition with allied forces. On land, Australia has developed the “Hardened Networked Army” program to expand and upgrade the Army’s capabilities. As part of this process, the government acquired 59 reconditioned M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks, has ordered 22 Eurocopter ‘Aussie’ Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopters, 40 NH90 tactical transport helicopters and has announced plans to upgrade the Army’s artillery forces.

The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) will also increase its capabilities through the acquisition of around 100 F-35 joint strike fighters (JSF) that will replace its F/A-18 fighter and F-111 strike aircraft beginning in 2012. To fill the capability gap that will emerge between the time that the F-111s will be retired and the JSFs will be available, the Howard government ordered 24 F/A-18F Super Hornets in 2007. This announcement was widely criticized, as the Super Hornets’ capabilities were seen as insufficient to fill the gap that they would be replacing. After reviewing the purchase, the new Labor government decided to proceed with it, adding a request for export approval of upgraded electronic warfare versions of the aircraft.[11] To increase the combat efficiency of the RAAF, the government has also committed to purchasing six airborne electronic warfare and control aircraft, as well as five multirole tanker transport aircraft. The RAAF’s airlift capabilities have also been enhanced through the acquisition of four C-17 heavy transport aircraft to augment its fleet of 24 C-130 transport aircraft.

However, Australian capabilities will see their largest increase on, over and under the water. Within the next 12-18 months, the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) four Adelaide-class guided-missile frigates (FFG) will re-enter service after a significant upgrade. The FFGs are being upgraded and equipped with SM-2 medium-range surface-to-air missiles, Evolved Sea Sparrow point-defense missiles, Harpoon anti-ship missiles and upgraded air, surface and underwater warfare capabilities.[12] They will rejoin the RAN’s eight ANZAC frigates (FF), which entered service between 1994 and 2004. The FFs are equipped with a main gun, Evolved Sea Sparrow and Harpoon missiles, torpedo tubes, and carry a Seahawk helicopter that can undertake anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare as well as search-and-rescue operations. In addition the new white papercalls for the ANZACs to be replaced with eight larger frigates designed and equipped with a strong emphasis on submarine detection and response operations.[13]

In addition to these existing ships, new classes of ships are being introduced into the RAN. In June 2007, the Howard government announced that it would purchase three Hobart-class air warfare destroyers (DDG) to be delivered between 2014 and 2017. The Hobart DDGs are to be equipped with the Aegis Combat System, as well as Harpoon, SM-6 and Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles. A decision on a possible fourth air warfare destroyer was deferred, however the new white paper indicates that this will be sacrificed in order to fund other aspects of the procurement program.

In December 2007, the new Labor government authorized planning for new submarines to replace the RAN’s six Collins-class submarines. The new defense white paper recommens the purchase of 8-12 next-generation submarines from 2025. The new submarines will have a similar range as the Collins class — that is, well beyond the littoral waters of Australia — and may be equipped with cruise missiles and/or a number of unmanned mini-submarines for extended surveillance missions and landing special forces troops. The new white paper also reiterated the decision to purchase up to seven Global Hawk UAVs for maritime patrol.

Strategic Priorities

Since the end of the Cold War, Australia has envisioned the strategic risks it faces as a series of concentric rings, with the level of strategic interest for Australia increasing the closer to the center. The central ring represents the need to protect Australia from attack, and involves protecting the air and sea approaches to the continent. The second ring is the group of small neighboring states. Here Australia seeks to maintain strong and stable governments to prevent foreign influences from creating or taking advantage of instability within them. The next ring incorporates the wider Southeast Asian region, where the objective is to prevent regional domination by hostile forces. Beyond this lies the wider Asia-Pacific region, where the goal is to prevent strategic competition between major powers from disrupting the regional strategic order. Finally, the outer ring is the broader global order, where maintaining peace and stability in turn helps to maintain Asian and Australian security.

The 2008 National Security Statement revised this vision by explicitly outlining a number of strategic priorities for Australia. These included a commitment to maintain, as much as possible, a self-reliant approach to national security capabilities. The statement also reaffirmed the importance of the U.S. alliance, both globally and in the Asia-Pacific region. Engagement with the Asia-Pacific region — and in particular, with Southeast Asia — at a bilateral and multilateral level, with the goal of developing a culture of security cooperation throughout the region, was also highlighted. At the global level, the statement also articulated Australia’s support for multilateral institutions, in particular the United Nations, to promote a rules-based international order. The need for Australia to engage in creative middle-power diplomacy to prevent, reduce or delay the emergence of national security challenges was also stressed.

In the national security statement, the Rudd government also argued that a risk-based approach to assessing, prioritizing and resourcing national security priorities across the defense, diplomatic, intelligence and wider national-security community must also be developed. To this end the government announced the appointment of a National Security Adviser tasked with fostering a whole-of-government approach to security.

Finally, the National Security Statement also expanded the concept of non-traditional threats to include global terrorism, and the existence and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational crime, and cyber-security. These pose not only significant threats to Australian security, but in many ways form the central target of ADF and other security agencies’ current operations. Australia’s participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is a direct response to the terrorist attacks on the U.S. in 2001. Australia is also an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative, and in June 2008, the Rudd government established an International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. Meanwhile, the increased reliance on information technology makes Australia’s economy as well as its security systems vulnerable to attack from hackers, commercial entities, non-state actors such as terrorists, as well as foreign states. In the National Security Statement, the Rudd government announced plans to enhance Australia’s cybersecurity and is considering the recommendations of the recently completed cybersecurity review.

Other non-traditional threats — such as pandemics, climate change and energy security — were also highlighted as important threats to Australian security. The Rudd government has announced a forthcoming national energy security assessment that will lead to an energy white paper. Climate change in particular was emphasized as the most fundamental national security challenge for the long term. The government highlighted that significant climate change will increase unregulated population movements, reduce food production through reductions in arable land, and increase violent weather patterns that result in catastrophic events. The implications will require greater attention than they have been given in the past in Australia’s national security policy and analysis process.[14]

Conclusion

The new defense white paper re-enforces the balanced force structure, whereby the ADF is capable of engaging across the spectrum of operation — both regionally and globally, unilaterally or in coalition with other states rather than returning to the Defence of Australia doctrine — or shifting to a “focused force” approach as articulated by Hugh White, the principal author of the 2000 white paper, in a recent Lowly Institute paper. In his call for a focused force, White argues for the development of the ADF’s capabilities for stabilization and maritime denial operations. To this end, he articulates the need to increase the size of the Army to 8-12 battalions, depending on whether the government wants it to have a high-intensity combat capability.

For the RAN, White advocates for a fleet of surface warships comprising the ANZAC patrol frigates and a number of smaller amphibious support ships, in order to support stabilization operations in the Asia Pacific region. The primary role for the RAN in the focused force, however, is in providing a maritime denial capability, and for this he calls for a fleet of 12 to 18 next-generation submarines. Likewise, there is a need for advanced fighter aircraft for maritime denial operations, in order to maintain command of the air over Australia’s maritime approaches. For this, White argues that RAAF be equipped with up to 200 fifth-generation fighter aircraft.[15]

This approach does address a discrepancy between the declaratory and operational reality of the ADF. Australia has traditionally focused force structures around expensive, high-technology weapons and platforms designed to allow the RAN and RAAF to defend the air-sea gap. However, the actual operations that the ADF has undertaken over the past 40 years have been in peacekeeping and/or peace-enforcement operations, both within and without the region.

While the 2000 defense white paper began a shift towards the balanced force approach to Australian security planning, the concept of concentric circles of strategic interest for Australia has proven to be a misnomer when it comes to actual deployment of Australian troops. Since the end of the Cold War, Australia has participated in several U.N. or coalition interventions, including the first Gulf War and the subsequent naval sanction enforcement operation in the Persian Gulf, the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia in 1992-93, the Unified Task force in Somalia in 1993, the U.N. Assistance Mission to Rwanda between 1993 and 1996, and the Bougainville Peace Monitoring Group between 1998 and 2003.

Australia has also led regional interventions in East Timor and the Solomon Islands, and has participated in higher level interventions as an active participant in the U.S.-led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Australia’s commitment to the latter has, to date, focused on the deployment of special forces task groups. But in Afghanistan, Australia has just under 1,500 ADF personnel deployed and it is expected to increase that number in the near future.

Nevertheless, the new white paper rejects the focused force structure maintains the balanced force approach of the 2000 white paper. This provides the government with a wide range of capability options and will fit with current acquisition programs. Moreover, it avoids the biggest problem with the focused force option, namely, personnel recruitment. The Army is currently struggling to sustain its current six battalions, the RAAF cannot find enough pilots for its existing fleet of 100 fighter and strike aircraft and the RAN has only enough submariners to deploy three of its Collins-class submarines.

Finally, the new white paper perpetuates what this author considers to be an over-emphasis on the potential threat of China and the potential for great power confrontation in the Asia Pacific. While this is a highly contentious assessment — and one that is not shared by either the Australian intelligence community or by U.S. defense planners — it is further compounded by an over-emphasis on China’s conventional military threat. Should Australian defense planners truly believe that there is a danger of confrontation between the U.S. and China, then the focus of planning should shift from potential conventional threats posed by the PLA to the possible consequences of China’s declared asymmetric strategic approach.

Militarily, the PLA seeks to develop niche capabilities targeting “Revolution in Military Affairs” capabilities, in order to degrade a technologically superior enemy’s information advantage. For example, the PLAN has adopted a strategy of using its growing submarine force to threaten U.S. aircraft carriers should conflict over Taiwan emerge. Moreover, there is growing concern regarding China’s use of cyberspace for espionage, including mining commercial secrets and cyber-attacks. The Chinese have been accused of launching “denial of service attacks” on key Western internet infrastructures. Likewise, there are growing fears regarding China’s ability to use its financial resources as a weapon. While the 2008 National Security Statement did highlight the growing threat of cybersecurity, insufficient attention appears to be given to this aspect of the threat.

Moreover, while many Australian defense and security policymakers tend to focus on force structures and future strategic risks and opportunities, there is a lack of attention given to current operational needs. In early April 2009, Minister of Defense Joel Fitzgibon admitted that large investments were needed to address the hollowness in existing ADF capabilities. For example, the Army’s Blackhawk helicopters could not be deployed to Afghanistan due to a lack of electronic protection. Other examples include key vulnerabilities to a variety of ADF equipment: The M113 armored personnel carriers are vulnerable to improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the RAN’s ships to submarine warfare, and the F/A-18s to the latest surface-to-air missiles.

By focusing on the potential for great power conflict as a driver for future force structure, Australian defense planners may degrade Australia’s ability to conduct the operations that it is likely to actually undertake in the next 20-30 years. While the new white paper quite rightly sets out Australia’s strategic priorities over the coming decades, more attention needs to be given to the immediate needs of the ADF. Unfortunately, this is not likely to happen.

Dr. Craig A Snyder is a senior lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University, Geelong, Victoria, Australia.

Notes:

[1] The Coalition government comprises the two conservative political parties, the larger Liberal Party and the National Party.
[2] Roy Campbell McDowall, Howard’s Long March: The Strategic Depiction of China in Howard Government Policy 1996-2006, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, Canberra, The Australian National University E Press, 2009.
[3] Kevin Rudd, “The First National Security Statement to the Parliament Address by the Prime Minister of Australia The Hon. Kevin Rudd MP,” December 4, 2008 http://www.pm.gov.au/media/speech/2008/speech_0659.cfm (accessed December 10, 2008).
[4] Rudd, “The First National Security Statement.”
[5] Australia, Department of Defence, Force 2020, Public Affairs & Corporate Communication, Department of Defence, Canberra, June 2002
[6] See Hugh White, A Focused Force: Australia’s Defence Priorities in the Asian Century, Lowy Institute Paper 26, Sydney, Lowy Institute for International Policy, April 2009
[7] Mike Pezullo quoted in, Cameron Stewart and Patrick Walters, “Watchdog Probes Hawks’ Defence Intelligence Organisation Push on China,” The Australian (Sydney), April 14, 2009.
[8] While ANZUS is technically a trilateral treaty most of the functions of the treaty are carried out on a bilateral basis.
[9] The FPDA, comprising Australia, Britain, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, is not a formal alliance however, it does have the only operational element of any multilateral Asian security organization, the Integrated Area Defence System (IADS) that covers peninsular Malaysia and the Malacca Straits.
[10] Mark Dodd, “Support Grows for Asia-Pacific Push”, The Australian (Sydney), April, 22 2009.
[11] Philip Dorling, “Prowling Growlers: Extra Sting for Super Hornets,” Canberra Times, February 28, 2009
[12] Lee Cordner, “Aussie Frigates Reborn,” Proceedings, vol. 135, no. 3, (March 2009).
[13] Patrick Walters, “White Paper Orders Huge Military Build-up”, The Australian (Sydney), April 25, 2009
[14] Rudd, “The First National Security Statement”.
[15] White, A Focused Force.

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