Michael A. Cohen

After the debacles of Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. should be contemplating a future of military restraint and foreign policy modesty. But that doesn't appear to be happening. Meanwhile, the current budgetary environment makes it likely that the State Department will be facing cuts to its already inadequate budget. So what, if anything, can be done to reverse the militarization of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Sept. 11 era?
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The U.S. response to Sept. 11 was far less a reaction to one act of terrorism, and far more a story of creeping American militarism. The most enduring legacy of Sept. 11 may be the extent to which it sped up the process of engaging the armed forces in every element of U.S. foreign policy: from supporting development projects and democracy-promotion efforts to engaging in nation-building and post-conflict stabilization. more

While the death of Osama bin Laden represents the long overdue demise of one man, its impact on the long-term trajectory of American foreign policy is likely to be more profound. Al-Qaida will not simply disappear overnight. But bin Laden's death does mean that the exaggerated role that terrorism has played in America's foreign policy discussions for the past 10 years can finally come to an end. more

The Iraq and Afghanistan wars are reminders that the use of U.S. military force can have unforeseen and often unpredictable consequences. For that reason, force should be considered only in the most pressing of national security circumstances. Unfortunately, if the response to the uprising in Libya is any indication, it seems many members of the foreign policy community need a refresher course on this point. more

At the heart of the U.S. war in Afghanistan lies a striking and unresolved contradiction. While the U.S. has sent approximately 100,000 troops to this impoverished, landlocked country to combat a fearsome local insurgency, the focal point of U.S. policy in the region revolves around protecting and stabilizing Pakistan. Yet, for a policy that is so solicitous of Pakistani needs, it is disconnected from Pakistani interests. more

In the two weeks since Gen. David Petraeus was nominated to be the new commander for U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan, continuity has been the dominant theme in describing what his replacement of ousted Gen. Stanley McChrystal represents. But continuity is the worst possible option for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, because it would mean maintaining a strategy that appears increasingly unlikely to succeed. more

During the 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama famously declared that he was running for the nation's highest office not simply to end the war in Iraq, but to change the mindset that got America involved in Iraq in the first place. More than a year into his presidency, he is discovering that such a seminal transformation is far easier said than done. more

When President Barack Obama accepts his Nobel Peace Prize this week in Oslo, it will likely amplify the grumbling of those who think he is being rewarded for circumscribing American power. These criticisms miss the point. Barack Obama isn't weak. He just helms a superpower whose power and influence is on the wane. more

Once upon a time, there was a grand and influential foreign policy doctrine. It was based on some traditional notions about U.S. statecraft that placed severe constraints on when America went to war. This doctrine was called the Powell Doctrine, and after the twin conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan, it's hard to imagine a strategic doctrine that is more appropriate. more

Dambisa Moyo's new book, "Dead Aid," is a prime example of an old idea -- that foreign assistance for Africa hasn't worked -- wrapped up in new packaging. As a Harvard-educated child of Africa (Zambia), with stints at Goldman Sachs and the World Bank, Moyo makes for an appealing messenger. But while her solutions may seem reasonable, her argument is simplistic, and even dangerous. more