Gadhafi's Chemical Weapons: A Nightmare Scenario in Libya

The rapidly spreading chaos in Libya should give the American people
pause, and may end up giving the U.S. military another item to add to
its endless to-do list. Setting the stage for what might be called the
battle for Tripoli, anti-government forces and rebel military units are
moving from the country's apparently "liberated" east to face off
against Moammar Gadhafi's Praetorian Guard of tribal and regime
loyalists. The New York Times described
"clusters of heavily armed men in mismatched uniforms clutching machine
guns," "dozens of checkpoints operated by . . . plainclothes
militiamen," and "machine-gun toting foreign mercenaries" stalking the
capital, and compared the unfolding situation to the anarchy in Somalia.
The emerging Libyan civil war is significant not just for the bloodshed
and instability it will visit on this Mediterranean powder keg. Libya
has somewhere between 9.5 tons and 14 tons of mustard gas, according to intelligence sources cited by the Wall Street Journal. As Gadhafi's
regime focuses on holding on to power, as the Libyan military splinters
and as the country disintegrates, it's not difficult to imagine those
stockpiles being left unguarded and falling into the hands of America's
enemies. The candidates are numerous: al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb; a
rogue Libyan faction; Gadhafi's mercenary army from Chad, Sudan and
Niger; a post-Gadhafi regime; or even, if he survives, a post-uprising
Gadhafi -- even more paranoid and more unhinged than the man Ronald
Reagan once aptly described as "squalid" and "Looney Tunes."
Any of these scenarios would pose a significant threat to the United
States and its closest allies, and making sure none of them transpire
must be a priority as events unfold. Trusting the current or future
Libyan government -- or governments, in the event of a fracturing of the
country -- is simply not an option, which means Washington must
contemplate using military force to pre-empt these materials from
falling into worse hands.
Toward that end, it's important to keep in mind that Libya is not Egypt,
and the positives and negatives for Washington are significantly
different.
On the negative side of the ledger, unlike in Egypt, the U.S. does not
have substantive military-to-military contacts or a massive aid spigot
in Libya, both of which have been used to great effect in Egypt. Also on
the negative side, Gadhafi is no Hosni Mubarak. The latter attempted a
limited crackdown against popular protests before stepping aside. The
former called in air force and artillery units to murder hundreds, and
perhaps thousands, before promising to make the streets run with blood.
On the plus side, Libya does not control a strategic waterway, is not
party to a peace agreement that has served as the linchpin of regional
stability for 30 years and is not an anchor state in the Arab world.
Moreover, Washington does not owe Libya's leadership anything. There is
no need for polite displays of loyalty or diplomatic niceties with this
dictator. These realities should give the U.S. more flexibility and
freedom of action in dealing with Libya and its chemical weapons
material.
If the intelligence on the whereabouts of the chemicals is solid, the
U.S. could neutralize or secure the materials quietly and covertly,
using CIA and Special Operations units. Nevertheless, inserting U.S.
personnel into the middle of a civil war leaves much to be desired.
Moreover, moving -- or guarding -- 14 tons of anything is seldom done
quietly.
Striking the facilities by air poses less risk to U.S. personnel but
still presents challenges. To be sure, the U.S. Air Force is equal to
the task. However, a counterproliferation airstrike would probably strip
away any plausible deniability. When a complex of buildings 60 miles
south of Tripoli goes up in flames in the middle of the night, people
are going to hear it, see it and feel it, and they will point their
fingers at the U.S. Air Force.
Moreover, worries about risk to civilians would have to be taken into account. In this regard, it's important to remember that: first, one of the main ways weaponized mustard is destroyed is by incineration; second, any airstrike would employ ordnance designed to burn off the material; and third, the U.S. bombarded Iraqi facilities during the 1991 Gulf War that produced and stored mustard, anthrax and other agents. Saddam Hussein surely would have told the world if civilians had been harmed by the release of these agents. Even so, it's up to the White House and the Pentagon to make sure their solution to this problem is not worse than the problem itself. ...
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