Editor's Note: This article was originally published on Sept. 15, 2009, as part of the WPR feature "Illicit Flows and Transnational Threats." It is made available here for free, as part of a promotion that ends Jan. 5. To experience more of WPR's subscription service, sign up for a 30-day free trial.
In January 2009, retired Gen. Mauro Tello Quiñones took command of a police unit charged with combating drug-related violence in the popular Mexican tourist destination of Cancún. The assignment lasted just one week. In early February, Tello and two aides were kidnapped and killed. Before murdering Tello, the assailants broke his arms and legs and tortured him for hours. The incident provoked shock across Mexico, with the governor of Quintana Roo state calling it "truly horrible." Even by the standards of the violent drug war that has consumed Mexico of late, this crime stood out for its brazenness and brutality. In short, it bore all the marks of an attack by the notorious paramilitary organization known as Los Zetas.
Originally composed of 31 army deserters who went to work for a cartel boss, the Zetas have evolved over the past decade into a sophisticated criminal enterprise with more than 1,000 members. Drawing on military-style skills and a penchant for the gruesome, the group has expanded its illegal activities and established itself as the most feared and destructive player in the Mexican drug trade. The Zetas have ruthlessly seized market share, waged a bloody campaign against the authorities, and used coercion and bribery to hollow out government institutions from within. Their exploits have spurred the militarization of the Mexican drug trade. In short, they have done more than any other entity to foster the cycle of violent chaos in which the country is currently trapped. Having begun as hired guns, the Zetas now represent the single greatest threat to the Mexican state.
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The Zetas were founded in 1997 amid the dramatic intensification of the Mexican drug trade. During the 1990s, drug trafficking in Mexico became a more lucrative -- and also a deadlier -- profession: more lucrative because U.S. interdiction programs in the Caribbean made Mexico the primary entry point for cocaine and heroin consumed in the United States; deadlier because the rules that once governed the business broke down. For decades, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had overseen a system in which drug kingpins paid bribes and kept violence to a minimum. In return, the PRI protected the cartels and allocated access to the plazas, or drug-running corridors into the United States. As the PRI lost power during the 1990s, this system came apart, and comparative stability gave way to a Hobbesian struggle for the plazas.
The epicenter of this bloodshed was Nuevo Laredo, a city of 350,000 inhabitants that sits directly across the border from IH-35, the chief north-south artery in the United States. To protect this valuable real estate, Gulf Cartel chief Osiel Cárdenas decided to form an elite paramilitary group that would give him an edge over the rival Sinaloa Cartel. In 1997, he induced 31 gafes, or members of Mexico's Airborne Special Forces Group, to switch sides, and the Zetas -- who take their name from the radio code for "captain" -- were born.
When the Zetas signed on with Cárdenas, they brought with them a set of skills unique in the Mexican drug trade. The gafes were Israeli-trained counterinsurgency specialists with expertise in ambushes, marksmanship, intelligence, intimidation, and other military techniques -- skills they put to good use in their new profession. The Zetas murdered Cárdenas' competitors, safeguarded his drug shipments, served as his personal protection detail, and became an invaluable asset to the Gulf Cartel.
After Cárdenas was arrested by the Mexican authorities in 2003 and extradited to the United States in 2007, however, the Zetas went into business for themselves. Led by Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano and Jaime González Durán, they eliminated several Gulf lieutenants and forced their way into the upper echelons of cartel leadership. The Zetas commandeered a large chunk of Gulf operations, embraced new criminal activities -- including robbery, kidnapping, extortion, money laundering, and human smuggling -- and expanded their area of operations to include much of Mexico, as well as parts of Guatemala and the United States. They also grew numerically. When Cárdenas was arrested, there were around 300 Zetas; as of early 2009, there were somewhere between 1,000 and 3,000. Originally cartel enforcers, the Zetas have now become a full-fledged drug-trafficking organization (DTO) in their own right.
As the Zetas have expanded, they have sought to retain the martial qualities that infused the original band of 31. The group now includes several dozen Kaibiles, Guatemalan counterinsurgency specialists who, like the original Zetas, deserted the army in search of higher pay. The Kaibiles are renowned for their skill and ruthlessness. Their motto is: "If I advance, follow me. If I stop, urge me on. If I retreat, kill me." The Zetas also continue to recruit among Mexican military personnel -- not difficult to do, as well over 100,000 soldiers deserted between 2000 and 2009 -- and have established training camps where new members receive instruction in assassination, kidnapping, torture, and intelligence techniques. These courses last three months, and are reportedly so rigorous that a number of recruits have lost their lives.
The military ethos is also evident from the group's command structure, which is divided into five distinct tiers. Los Halcones constitute the lowest tier, gathering information and acting as the "eyes of the city." Los Cobras provide security for drug shipments and Zeta higher-ups. Zetas Nuevos are the shock troops who carry out the bloody assaults for which the group has become famous. Cobras Viejos are more experienced Cobras in charge of coordinating trafficking and security affairs. Zetas Viejos each control a plaza, and command assistants ranging from computer specialists to money launderers. Only individuals with a military background can attain the rank of Zeta Nuevo or Zeta Viejo, and the latter group is composed primarily of men who have been with the organization since its inception or shortly thereafter. Military-style discipline governs interactions between the ranks: It has been reported that Cobras are not allowed to fire unless so ordered by a superior.
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When the Zetas emerged as their own distinct entity, it marked an epochal shift in the Mexican drug trade. Mexican DTOs had heretofore employed thugs and petty criminals as enforcers. Now a group of well-trained soldiers had taken over a DTO and began to run it as a paramilitary organization.
The implications were soon apparent. The Zetas were the first Mexican DTO to employ a military-grade arsenal, making the jump from the standard AK-47 to shoulder-fired missiles, armor-piercing ammunition, fragmentation grenades, heavy machine guns, and even improvised explosive devices. Some of these weapons are stolen from the Mexican military or purchased on the black market. Most are bought legally in the United States and smuggled across the border.
Arguably more important, the Zetas were the first to combine this massive firepower with expertise in infantry squad tactics, complex assaults, and other military techniques. The result has been a qualitative escalation in the intensity of drug-related violence in Mexico. As Fred Burton of Stratfor notes, "Assault rifles in the hands of untrained thugs are dangerous, but if those same rifles are placed in the hands of highly trained special-forces soldiers who can operate as a fire team, they can be overwhelmingly powerful."
Over the past several years, the Zetas have used these capabilities to batter their competition and carry out a string of deadly assaults against Mexican authorities. Tello's murder was just the latest in a series of assassinations by the Zetas. The group also killed Nuevo Laredo's police chief in 2005 just hours after he took office, and government officials in other Zeta-controlled towns have met a similar fate. The Zetas regularly attack police stations, ambush government convoys, and wage fierce firefights against rival DTOs as well as the Mexican military. Since 2007, groups of up to 50 Zetas have also orchestrated mass jailbreaks in Tamaulipas, Michoacán, Veracruz, and Durango.
The Zetas have distinguished themselves not only with their audacity, but also with their savagery. Zeta operatives subject their captives to prolonged torture before executing them -- often by decapitation, immolation, strangulation, or other grisly methods. In one instance, the Zetas stuffed four individuals suspected of working for a rival DTO inside barrels of diesel fuel and burned them to death. Such brutality serves a dual purpose. Torture allows the Zetas to elicit information from their victims, while graphic execution scenes send a chilling message to competitors. As political scientist George Grayson comments, "Even mentioning the word 'Zeta' conjures images of castrations, decapitations, and immersion in vats of lye."
The Zetas do not rely on brute force alone. Their skill set has also allowed them to undertake more sophisticated operations. The group executes infiltration attacks with precision. In 2007, for instance, Zetas masquerading as soldiers gained access to two police stations and executed seven government officials. Their technological capabilities are equally impressive, and the Zetas have coordinated kidnappings and assassinations by tracking their rivals' cellphone signatures. Similarly, the Zetas are adept at the arts of propaganda and intimidation. They publish lists of police officers to be targeted for assassination, demand that local newspapers feature extensive coverage of their bloody exploits, and -- borrowing from the Iraqi insurgents --were the first Mexican DTO to post execution videos on YouTube. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Zetas have now become "the most technologically advanced, sophisticated and violent" of the Mexican DTOs.
Next page: Combining inducement and brutality . . .
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