Last week, the U.S.-led Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) had nothing but praise for Shiite theocrat-wannabe Moqtada al-Sadr. Prefacing his name with "al-Sayyid" (the Honorable), the United States acknowledged al-Sadr's legitimacy in the Iraqi political scene as U.S. commanders warmly embraced his decision to maintain a ceasefire between his roughly 60,000-strong illegal militia (Jaish al-Mahdi or JAM) and Iraqi government and coalition forces. With a tenuous domestic political situation in Iraq, the United States had no choice but to shake hands with the devil.
Without question, the short-term effects of the U.S. surge strategy have been highly positive: significant reductions of violence in almost every province in the country, and especially in Baghdad, the epicenter of the insurgency. Hundreds of U.S. and likely thousands of Iraqi lives have been saved. This is due not only to the proper application of counterinsurgency doctrine and improvements in training and equipping Iraqi security forces, but also to a significant shift by the United States toward political accommodation with former enemies. ...
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