Despite new commonalities of interest arising from chaos and change in the Middle East, and after a brief moment of opportunity for a diplomatic breakthrough a year ago, Israel and Turkey’s relations remain in a deep freeze at the highest levels of government. Yet bilateral trade continues to boom, and economic ties are robust at many other levels. Nevertheless, the two states are unlikely to reconcile politically any time soon, absent changes of leadership on both sides and the prior resolution of a host of other more pressing regional problems.

Israel has long felt isolated in the region and drew on its closer relationship with Turkey in the 1990s and the first part of the 2000s to counter that. That relationship began to cool with the 2009 Gaza War, which then-Prime Minister and now President Recep Tayyip Erdogan vehemently opposed. Ties were all but frozen after the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, when an Israeli raid on a Gaza-bound Turkish aid flotilla left nine Turkish citizens dead.

Over the past three years, however, Turkey has found itself in a similar bind. It ended its relationship with the Syrian government, openly supporting the ouster of President Bashar al-Assad and hosting Syrian rebels in Turkey, and took positions on regional issues that left it at varying degrees of contention with Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and the Arab Gulf states.

Turkey’s need for a foreign policy victory, combined with a shared Israeli view that Assad, as an Iranian proxy, was the greater problem in Syria, led to a potential deal in the spring of 2014 to address Turkish grievances, which initially included an apology, compensation to the victims’ families and lifting the Gaza blockade. But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu balked. Why the deal fell apart is not entirely clear. But it likely revolved around Netanyahu’s fear that Erdogan would portray it as an Israeli capitulation for his political gain. Unfortunately for both sides, what seemed like an opportune moment has passed and is unlikely to emerge again in the foreseeable future.

Any sense of urgency to reconcile that may have once existed in either Israel or Turkey has dissipated. Turkey, after finally recognizing that the “precious loneliness” it was experiencing in the region was not serving its interests well, has made inroads with Saudi Arabia, Iraq and other potential regional allies. That has made the prospect of thawing ties with Israel not as attractive as it may have once been, including with regard to Syria. Although Turkey had earlier hopes for Israel as a potential ally in dealing with the chaos just over their borders, recent cooperation with the United States on training and arming Syrian rebel groups has made an Israeli buy-in superfluous in Ankara’s eyes.

On the Israeli side, any sense of panic initially induced by the loss of Turkey as a strategic ally recedes with each passing day. Israel sees its most pressing challenges as an empowered Iran, a rearmed Hamas and Hezbollah on its southern and northern borders, respectively, and growing discontent in the West Bank. None of these will be alleviated by reconciliation with Turkey, and in fact in some cases Turkish involvement has only aggravated them. Simply put, Israeli attention is too consumed by a raft of other issues to make rapprochement with Turkey a high priority.

This lack of urgency is underscored by the fact that on the economic side, the political fallout seems to have had no appreciable effect. Trade between Turkey and Israel is up 19 percent since 2009 and reached $5.6 billion in 2014. More Israelis flew on Turkish Airlines in 2014 than on any other foreign carrier. While the robust economic relationship has dampened any incentive for Erdogan and Netanyahu’s governments to paper over their differences, both sides have also responded to pressure from their respective business communities to not allow the political spat to get in the way of trade and commerce.

Yet that hasn’t stopped Israel and Turkey from moving even farther apart than they were a few years ago on major regional issues. Their approach at the start of the Arab Spring diverged, with Turkey embracing it—and even attempting to take credit for the protest movement—and Israel looking upon the popular uprisings with great skepticism. As events have unfolded across the region since, Turkish and Israeli policies have continued to clash on specific issues, most prominently over the overthrow of former President Mohammed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood-aligned government in Egypt and the rise of President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi.

Israel has embraced el-Sissi, viewing him as a partner in countering Islamist extremism generally and Hamas specifically. Turkey, meanwhile, has directed the kind of vitriol at the Egyptian government that in the past it reserved solely for Israel. A diplomatic row after Morsi’s ouster resulted in Egypt and Turkey barring each other’s envoys and downgrading their ties. As he continues to call for Morsi’s release and brands el-Sissi a “tyrant,” Erdogan has superimposed his own views of Turkey’s military and the history of Turkish military interventions onto el-Sissi’s actions in Egypt.

Israel and Turkey also differ sharply on their views of Iran’s nuclear program. While Turkey is generally wary of potential Iranian dominance of the region and has been on the opposite side of Iran in Syria and Iraq, Ankara has also been a large trading partner of Iran and has helped it subvert sanctions in a number of instances, most prominently through an illicit gas for gold scheme. Turkey supports Iran’s right to nuclear power and takes its pledges of peaceful purposes at face value—in obvious contrast to Israel’s hard-line position against any Iranian nuclear capability.

But the issue that divides Israel and Turkey more than any other and causes the most tension is Israel’s approach to the Palestinians. Erdogan and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu waste no opportunities to blast Israel over its actions in the West Bank and Gaza, and have frequently used hostility toward Israel as a potent campaign tactic. Israel resents Turkey’s constant verbal broadsides, which often veer into absurdly offensive territory, and is furious at Turkey’s years-long efforts to bolster Hamas and attempts to legitimize it as a political actor. The breakdown last year of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the subsequent war in Gaza have only hardened the situation. Turkish rhetoric has been so harsh that reconciliation is impossible without some progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front.

This poisonous recent history and complete lack of trust between Erdogan and Netanyahu make a resolution between the two sides remote until there is new leadership, which is not imminent on either side. Neither government feels any strong international incentive, given the absence of American pressure on its two allies to reconcile and the lack of any U.S. follow-up to Netanyahu’s March 2013 apology, engineered by President Barack Obama, for the Gaza flotilla raid. Combined with the regional issues that are pushing Israel and Turkey farther apart politically, the hostile political status quo is likely to continue indefinitely, even as economic ties continue to thrive.

Michael J. Koplow is the program director of the Israel Institute and an analyst of Turkish and Israeli politics and Middle East regional issues. He blogs at Ottomans and Zionists.