For the past several years, the widely accepted view among defense analysts had been that counterinsurgency, or COIN, represented the future of U.S. defense planning and operations. This consensus was initially driven by the belief that “effective COIN” had “won” the Iraq War, and later by the need, as former Defense Secretary Robert Gates put it, to fight “the wars we’re in.”
Now things have become far less clear. Awareness has set in that the effects of the 2007-2008 “surge” in Iraq were only partial and, even at the time, only partly achieved by the shift toward conducting what we know as “counterinsurgency.” And most now acknowledge that the “Afghan surge” has not had a similar effect as its Iraqi predecessor. ...
To read the rest, sign up to try World Politics Review
- TWO WEEKS FREE.
- Cancel any time.
- After two weeks, just $11.99 monthly or $94.99/year.
Request a free trial for your office or school. Everyone at a given site can get access through our institutional subscriptions.
- Global Insights: When it Comes to Nonproliferation, China Has Been a ‘Free Rider’
- Diplomatic Fallout: Why the International System Is Still Worth Fighting For
- Strategic Horizons: The Rise of the Islamic State and the Evolution of Violent Extremism
- Diplomatic Fallout: U.S., Russia Duel Over Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and Ukraine
- World Citizen: ISIS Victories Over Kurds Demand New U.S. Policy on Iraq