PARIS -- There has been much talk of late of impending "changes" in French foreign policy. New French President Nicolas Sarkozy's programmatic speech last month on foreign policy matters -- and especially his remarks on the "unacceptability" of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons -- first spurred such discussions. Then came the publication last week of former French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine's commissioned report to the French President on globalization and French foreign policy.
Védrine, a Socialist, served as Foreign Minister from 1997-2002 in the government of Lionel Jospin, in which capacity he famously qualified American counter-terrorism efforts in the aftermath of 9/11 as "simplistic." At roughly the same time, in early 2002, he again courted controversy by dismissing concerns about a series of anti-Semitic attacks in France with the words: "One shouldn't necessarily be surprised that young French people from immigrant families feel compassion for the Palestinians and get agitated when they see what is happening."
English-language coverage of the Védrine's report to Nicolas Sarkozy highlighted his recommendation that French foreign policy adopt a more "modest" tone: a seeming "concession" that some commentators interpreted as further evidence of a potential warming of Franco-American relations. The following passage, in particular, has been widely quoted:
As surprising as it may seem at a time when our country has just emerged from a long period of self-doubt and it has underestimated itself as "medium-sized" power, it continues to be regarded as "arrogant" in a large part of the world.
But what was, above all, overlooked in the English-language reports is that in recommending a change -- merely -- of "tone" in French foreign policy, Védrine was in fact calling for an essential continuity of substance. Far from foretelling an Atlantist turn in French foreign policy, moreover, Védrine's report identifies the prospect of closer relations with the United States as a "temptation" threatening French independence: a temptation that Védrine -- who is known to have a penchant for coinages -- dubs the "Atlantist/Westernist" temptation. Védrine also identifies a second current of thought allegedly challenging traditional French Foreign policy: what he calls the "Europeist" current. But the latter is clearly introduced into the report as a foil for his discussion of the "Atlantis/Westernist" current, which, he says ominously, "retains all of its ambitions."
World Politics Review here presents translated extracts from Hubert Védrine's report to the French President. Readers will be able to judge for themselves the degree of "modesty" they exhibit. The italicized titles are provided by WPR. The page numbers refer to the pdf-version of the Védrine report published on the Web site of the French Presidency.
John Rosenthal
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Recommendation for how France should respond to the challenges of globalization
It [France] conducts and inspires on the European level a much more offensive policy of protection, of solidarity and of regulation, such that Europe becomes the regulator of the global[ized] world. [p. 9]
...
We should make the European Union the most effective level of action in the process of globalization: the regulating power par excellence. [p. 26]
On the "Atlantist/Westernist" temptation to change French foreign policy
Nonetheless, in the France of 2007 one senses that there is a much stronger temptation [than the "Europeist" temptation] -- a temptation that is at once new and old -- to call into question French foreign policy: the "Westernist" temptation. [p. 35]
. . . What are the principle axes of the advocates of this "Westernist" reorientation, who typically do not show their true colors -- apart from a few isolated intellectuals trying to be provocative -- but present themselves rather under the comforting façade of a "modernization" (yet another!) of [French] foreign policy?
The first is the postulate of "common values" shared by Europe and the United States. There may be temporary disagreements with George Bush (and not even this is possible for all the members of this current of thought), but basically we are all supposed to be democracies under siege by the terrorists and threatened by China: the new "free world," in effect. The question as to whether recent American policy has not precisely increased such risks is not even posed by the defenders of this line. It follows that we should not unnecessarily criticize the United States, nor take our distance from the United States "for the pleasure of doing so." According to a well know schema, not opposing the United States without valid grounds becomes: not opposing the United States at all. Suspicion is thereby cast on a whole segment of French foreign policy, a whole heritage of French foreign policy -- tone, initiatives, methods, partnerships -- and even in those cases in which France evidently was right. . . . [p. 36]
According to the logic of this current of thought -- which is strong in the UMP [the party of Nicolas Sarkozy] and the world of industry and of defense, present in the PS [the Socialist Party], and significant in the media -- the particular position of France in NATO is a "problem." Up to now, the first four successors of General de Gaulle have preserved the essence of the decision that he was compelled to take following eight years of fruitless negotiations with the United States: to remove France from the obligation of any automatic military engagement [in NATO], while remaining, needless to say, in the alliance. If this question has not been the subject of public debate -- neither during the election campaign, nor since the election of President Sarkozy -- the temptation of a return to NATO well and truly exists. [p. 37]
. . . The point of principle [favoring a "return" to NATO] -- the question of Western solidarity [la cohérence occidentale] -- cannot be evaluated in terms of costs and benefits precisely because it is a point of principle, virtually a matter of doctrine. It is justified if France thinks of itself as, above all, a Western country, rather than first and foremost European or unique. [p. 38]
. . . One needs to ask what would be the price to pay for such a development [i.e. a "return" to NATO]. First, on the domestic scene. A part of public opinion -- and perhaps not only on the Left -- would be opposed or, in any case, would not understand the need for the change. At a time when the outgoing Bush administration has made the United States more unpopular than ever before in the world, what interest could there be in reviving such a polemic? The question could be posed differently -- perhaps -- after 2009.
On the international scene, such a development would provoke the enthusiasm of the American media and elected representatives: General de Gaulle has been forgotten, France has become a reliable ally again, France will help us in Iraq and elsewhere, etc. There would be satisfaction in Israel for the same reasons. A more ambivalent satisfaction in Great Britain. . . . Everywhere else, France would be considered to have realigned her policy to that of the United States and would be treated accordingly. The other world powers, established or emerging, would coldly take note of this development: Even if it had often proved illusory to attempt to contain [canaliser] or counterbalance the United States, in any case it would no longer be worthwhile to try to do so with the help of France and hence to promote France politically or favor France economically to this end.
For all other countries that are not world powers, at least some 150, the development would be perceived as the loss of a source of support in the U.N. and in the WTO and of a defender of their interests in the IMF, the World Bank and the G-8. But normal countries, much more so than world powers, have to be realistic and they will have soon found other sources of support. [pp. 38-39]
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